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POLITICAL EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE: HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?
CONOR CASEY*
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the administrative state and political executive
in constitutional democracies is typically channeled through a subconstitutional version of checks and balances. The competing roles and work
of a diverse cast of actors,1 including politicians, political appointees, and
independent civil servants, all ensure a workable accommodation between
important values and principles important to such systems, including
democratic accountability, efficacious governance for the common good,
technocratic expertise, and commitment to the rule of law.2 But for some,
this picture is under threat across many constitutional systems, in situations
where political executives are said to increasingly enjoy the balance of
control and power3 over the capacity of the administrative state apparatus,
through deploying an array of legal and political tools to centralize and
politicize its work to better align it with their ideology and political
objectives.
In some systems, political executives attempt to bolster their ability to
steer a bureaucracy in an ideological direction, sometimes significantly, but
without severely eroding its overall bureaucratic autonomy and
independence. But in others, executive control over bureaucracy effectively
amounts to its capture, a quasi-revolutionary transformation that seriously
© 2021 Conor Casey.
* Lecturer in Law, University of Liverpool School of Law & Social Justice. A version of this
Essay was presented at the Maryland Law School Constitutional Law “Schmooze” and a workshop
at Edinburgh Law School. The author would like to thank Mark Graber and Cormac Mac Amhlaigh
for kind invitations to these respective events. The author would also like to thank Adrian Vermeule
and Tarunabh Khaitan for helpful comments. Finally, the author would like to thank Carly Brody
and the Maryland Law Review editorial team for very helpful assistance.
1. Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term Foreword: 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (2017).
2. See Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the
Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2481 (2017).
3. Power is of course a contested concept, but in this context, I adopt a workable definition
common to political and legal theory which understands power to consist of the ability to “control
the outcomes of contested decisionmaking processes and secure . . . preferred policies” or “effect
substantive policy outcomes by influencing what the government will or will not do.” Daryl J.
Levinson, The Supreme Court 2015 Term Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 31, 39 (2016).
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alters how public power is channeled and exercised in the state. In this form,
the political executive has greater capacity to promote its ideological agenda
through the bureaucratic apparatus while severely reducing bureaucratic
autonomy and scope for civil servants to act as an internal check, capable of
challenging or obstructing executive policies.
Despite its importance for how public power is allocated and exercised,
this phenomenon is surprisingly underexplored from a comparative or
theoretical constitutional perspective. To begin the process of offering
critical and comparative analysis, this Essay draws eclectically on a range of
constitutional systems, both parliamentary and presidential, to highlight the
different kinds of legal and political tools available to political executives
striving to exercise greater control over the administrative state. I have two
objectives, one explanatory, the other critical. I first offer a descriptive
account of the diverse tools political executives—presidents, prime
ministers, cabinets—deploy to facilitate greater control over bureaucracies.
I also probe the possible incentives which seem to be driving their use and
the desire for greater control. After offering this account, I switch gears to
the critical, by offering a brief suggestion about how public lawyers ought to
approach normative analyses of executive attempts to leverage greater
control over the administrative state.
Part I briefly discusses the place of the administrative state in
contemporary constitutional democracies and the fact that it tends to have a
kind of internal separation of powers between political actors and civil
service personnel. Part II outlines the legal and political tools political
executives use to exercise greater control and direction over the
administrative state. Part III probes the different moral and political
incentives which seem to drive these trends by bundling them into several
conceptual ideal types. Part IV evaluates the normative issues arising from
these trends and argues that characterization of executive attempts to leverage
greater control as appropriate or abusive exercises of power inevitably
involves deeply contextual normative evaluation and, as such, public lawyers
should approach such evaluation with an analytical disposition of marked
caution.
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY
The administrative state’s emergence as a core engine of state
policymaking and governance came with the greater professionalization of
civil servants and increased bureaucratic autonomy. Civil servants began to
be appointed on the basis that they were not mere tools of an incumbent
political executive but had an overriding duty to serve the state and public
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interest.4 In turn, civil servants themselves began to work from the same
premise. Concepts like merit, technocratic competence, security of tenure,
and insulation from partisan politics all largely displaced political patronage
and loyalty as the leading principles guiding the work of bureaucracies. As
a result, values like expertise and commitment to professional norms came to
dominate the basis for most appointments and removals to the bureaucracy
and promotion to its senior ranks.5
An increasing emphasis on the importance of balancing executive
energy and the pursuit of democratic mandates, with norms and principles
like legality, technocratic competence, and professionalism, now all combine
to give contemporary administrators a robust level of autonomy from the
political executive. This balancing act has been described as a subconstitutional form of “internal separation of powers” between the political
executive and civil service, which fragments, channels, constrains, and limits
the use of administrative and regulatory power.6 As a critical component of
this internal system of checks and balances, bureaucratic autonomy has
several important consequences. First, it is said to make the bureaucracy
well-positioned to offer frank advice on executive proposals based on their
professional judgment, which can offer obstacles or improvements to
arbitrary, hyper-partisan, or poorly conceived policy initiatives “lacking a
scientific, legal, or commonsense foundation.”7 Second, bureaucratic
autonomy gives civil servants a wider scope to sustain opposition or
“resistance” to executive proposals that they consider dangerously
transcending norms of good governance and which risk veering into the
realm of the capricious, irrational, or hyper-partisan.8
II. TOOLS FACILITATING GREATER CONTROL
The administrative bodies and departments constituting the
administrative state in contemporary constitutional democracies are
generally subject to a measure of control from each of the three traditional
branches of government—but not the plenary control of any one of them—
and enjoy a measure of internal bureaucratic autonomy from the political

4. PETER CANE, CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: AN HISTORICAL COMPARISON 276
(2016); Lorne Sossin, From Neutrality to Compassion: The Place of Civil Service Values and Legal
Norms in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 427, 430 (2005).
5. See Sossin, supra note 4, at 431.
6. Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515,
536, 544 (2015).
7. Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1656 (2018).
8. Bijal Shah, Civil Servant Alarm, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 634 (2019); Rebecca Ingber,
Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 163–71 (2018);
Jennifer Nou, Civil Service Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 352 (2019).
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executive.9 However, it has also been documented across many systems that
apex executive actors increasingly enjoy the balance of control over the
administrative state. This happens when presidents, prime ministers, and
cabinets deploy legal and political tools to leverage more centralized and
politicized control and direction over bureaucracies and civil servants, tools
not typically open to the legislature or judiciary.10
A. Politicization of Appointment and Removal
A core concept in Max Weber’s influential discussion of modern
bureaucracies is that appointment to their ranks is based on “merit” as
measured through metrics like competitive exams and academic credentials,
not personal loyalty. This Weberian account of the bureaucratic appointment
process continues to ring true in contemporary constitutional democracies,
given that appointment to most civil service and agency posts is significantly
based on apolitical, merit-based criteria. While largely accurate, Weber’s
theoretical understanding of bureaucracy, and how its appointment process
works, is not an entirely complete one when matched against how many
contemporary systems function in practice. An accurate contemporary
account of bureaucratic appointment must also grapple with the endurance
of, and in some cases, thriving politicization of bureaucratic appointments
and removals.11
Appointment powers have long been used by executive actors in a
politicized manner to better ensure the executive’s policy goals are respected
and loyally implemented, and to embed the political morality of the executive
into the bureaucracy.12 Below I offer several constitutional democracies as
examples which show how the executive can use its appointment powers to
very potent political effect. I draw a distinction between executive
appointments and removal which steer a bureaucracy in an ideological
direction—but without severely eroding its overall bureaucratic autonomy

9. See Michaels, supra note 6, at 532–34.
10. Benedict Sheehy & Donald Feaver, Re-Thinking Executive Control of and Accountability
for the Agency, 54 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 175, 177–78 (2016). By “control” in this context, I am
referring simply to the ability of political executives to get administrative bodies and civil servants
to act to suit the former’s agenda in a manner which can encompass diluting the autonomous
bureaucratic capacity enjoyed by administrators, a dilution which can occur both amongst civil
servants working in core departments of the executive branch, as well as in administrative bodies
deliberately designed to be highly independent in discharging their functions.
11. Politicization in this context being understood as “the substitution of political criteria for
merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of
the public service.” B. GUY PETERS & JON PIERRE, POLITICIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE QUEST FOR CONTROL 2 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
12. Christopher A. Cooper, Bureaucratic Identity and the Resistance of Politicization, 50
ADMIN. & SOC’Y 30, 31 (2018).
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and independence—and appointments which can functionally effect capture
of the bureaucratic apparatus by the political executive.
B. Steering the Bureaucracy
In the United States, one of the most important means presidents have
at their disposal to assert control over the administrative state is their ability
to appoint and remove leadership personnel from cabinet departments and
independent agencies13 using Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Article II
and its Appointments Clause give the President authority to appoint, with the
consent of the Senate, the thousands of “[o]fficers of the United States” who
staff the upper ranks of the federal bureaucracy.14
Notwithstanding heated debate15 over the precise scope of the removal
power aspect of the Appointments Clause, judicial precedent and political
practice nonetheless combine to provide ample room for presidents to appoint
personnel to administrative bodies who share their ideological viewpoint and
remove officials who frustrate their policy objectives.16 Together, these
powers constitute one of the principal gateways through which presidents
influence the policy direction of the administrative state.17 Such powers have
been used to extensively politicize the appointment and removal process, and
presidential appointees can generally be expected to loyally implement the
chief executive’s political objectives within often vague statutory bounds set
by Congress. Even with political appointees inside so-called independent
agencies, presidents can be confident they will generally choose to align their
policymaking with the ideological preferences of the presidency.18
This is why, for example, administrators tend to implement the exact
same congressional statutes very differently depending on the presidential
incumbent, shifts facilitated by the fact congressional statutes are often
capacious and provide ample room for executive (re)interpretation.19 For
example, the same agencies spanning the Obama and Trump Administrations
took radically divergent stances on contentious matters like LGBT issues,
policing of speech and sexual assault investigations on college campuses,
13. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
DO IT 260–61 (2000).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
15. See Seth Barrett Tillman, The Puzzle of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77, 33 HARV. J. L. &
Pub. Pol. 149, 149–67 (2010).
16. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
17. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1180
(2013).
18. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration, 98 TEX.
L. REV. 265, 277 (2019).
19. Michaels, supra note 6, at 556.
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immigration enforcement, and environmental regulation. On each occasion,
heads of the relevant administrative bodies in charge of these policies
unsurprisingly abandoned policy positions adopted by their predecessors and
rapidly aligned themselves and their agency’s stance foursquare with the
ideological position of the new president.20 Presidential appointments can
thus significantly shift the ideological direction of the administrative state
and the nature of its regulatory output.21
In Japan, bureaucrats have traditionally been a highly autonomous and
powerful group, typically hired through a merit system that requires a very
competitive standardized qualification exam and impeccable credentials.22
Traditionally, the Japanese bureaucracy has combined a reputation for
technocratic competence and professionalism with the “political neutrality of
staff, particularly with regard to the relationship between bureaucracy and
political authority.”23 A good demonstration of its traditional autonomy is
the fact that the civil service has long self-regulated promotion to its upper
echelons. While the political executive has formal legal authority over
appointments, it has long acquiesced in the internal choices made by
bureaucrats themselves.24
This high level of autonomy has recently come under strain as the
political executive has sought to increasingly politicize the appointment
process. The political executive’s authority over bureaucratic appointments
has been bolstered significantly post-2014 legislative reforms spearheaded
by then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.25 This shift in appointment practice has
led some to fear bureaucratic officials will be less likely to serve as an
independent source of advice for the political executive or a check on partisan
excess, on the basis officials seeking promotion to the upper echelons of the
bureaucracy will have to be more attuned to discerning and following the
Prime Minister’s “expressed or implicit directives” when carrying out their
statutory mandates.26
A remarkable demonstration of the impact of the appointment power
when deployed in a politicized way can be seen with the Cabinet Legislation

20. CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 77–78 (2020).
21. Id.
22. Ko Mishima, A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins? The Civil Service Reform of 2014, 40
INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1101, 1106 (2017).
23. Mayu Terada, The Changing Nature of Bureaucracy and Governing Structure in Japan, 28
WASH. INT’L L.J. 431, 433 (2019); see also T.J. Pempel, Bureaucracy in Japan, 25 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 19, 19 (1992).
24. Mishima, supra note 22, at 1104.
25. Terada, supra note 23, at 456.
26. Cheng-Yi Huang, Unenumerated Power and the Rise of Executive Primacy, 28 WASH. J.
INT’L L.J. 395, 407 (2019).
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Bureau’s (“CLB”) revision of its decades-long interpretation of Article 9 of
the Japanese constitution—the war renunciation clause. The CLB27 is the
key advisory organ to the government over legal and constitutional affairs
and is regarded as highly independent28 and technocratic29 in its functions.
While the CLB’s role has no basis in constitutional text, some argue that it
has an even more influential role over issues of legal and constitutional
interpretation than the Supreme Court.30 Decades-long CLB interpretation
of Article 9 stipulated that Japan had a very limited right to maintain security
forces for self-defense.31 This interpretation was a thorn in the side of Prime
Minister Abe and his vision for Japanese foreign policy. Aware that it would
be politically difficult to pursue a constitutional amendment of Article 9
through the formal amendment procedure, Prime Minister Abe and his
Cabinet shifted their efforts to find informal ways of modifying the decadeslong CLB constitutional interpretation.32
To this end, in 2014, the government established an ad hoc advisory
committee to advise on the possibility of a new interpretation, the Advisory
Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, which then advised
in favor of reinterpretation of Article 9.33 Around the same time, the Prime
Minister demanded the resignation of the director of the CLB and used his
appointment authority to appoint a new head, who was widely regarded as
very sympathetic to the government’s stance on departing from established
CLB precedent.34 In a distinct departure from tradition, the Prime Minister
did not appoint a head from within the senior ranks of the CLB but
“intentionally appointed” a loyalist from outside the organization to the
position to allegedly “meddle in the bureaucratic culture”35 and secure
support for the reinterpretation.

27. Hajime Yamamoto, Interpretation of the Pacifist Article of the Constitution by the Bureau
of Cabinet Legislation: A New Source of Constitutional Law?, 26 WASH. L. REV. 99, 109 (2017).
28. Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Neither Legal Nor Political? Bureaucratic Constitutionalism in
Japanese Law, 26 KING’S L.J., 193, 205 (2015).
29. Mamoru Seki, The Drafting Process for Cabinet Bills, 19 L. JAPAN 168, 183 (1986).
30. David Kenny & Conor Casey, Shadow Constitutional Review: The Dark Side of PreEnactment Review in Ireland and Japan, 18 INT’L J. CONST. L. 51, 59 (2020); David S. Law, Why
Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1425, 1454 (2011).
31. Kenny & Casey, supra note 30, at 60.
32. Yamamoto, supra note 27, at 112.
33. The Committee comprised “a group of experts in fields from international relations and
diplomacy to international law, but nonetheless contained few lawyers, and only one constitutional
scholar. It was argued in the media that members of the panel were primarily selected for their
hawkish views on national security.” Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional
Amendment and the “Reinterpretation” of Japan’s War Powers, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 427, 475
(2017) (footnotes omitted).
34. Yasuo Hasebe, The End of Constitutional Pacifism? 26 WASH. INT’L L.J. 125, 128 (2017).
35. Huang, supra note 26, at 406.
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What is important for this Essay is not the cogency of the
reinterpretation, but how the episode highlights the potential impact of
executive appointment powers. The authority and respect afforded to this
bureaucratic institution, combined with the executive’s appointment powers,
allowed the political executive to shape CLB’s policy in a manner that gave
a shield of legitimacy to executive action, which some regarded as a
constitutionally questionable circumvention of the formal constitutional
amendment process.36 The same outcome—a seismic shift in the CLB’s
interpretation of a key constitutional provision—may not have been possible
had the appointment to the CLB been an entirely technocratic process.
In India, appointments to senior bureaucratic posts have similarly been
long determined by a combination of merit-based exams and seniority. But
like his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Modi has recently spearheaded
significant changes to the basis for apex bureaucratic appointments. The
executive has made inroads to sidestep the traditional process of exams and
seniority by adopting a parallel system of appointments characterized by
political discretion, allowing the executive to parachute political appointees
into senior positions where it thinks expedient.37 Professor Khaitan also
highlights how the executive has made concerted use of its dominance over
the appointment process to embed political loyalists into watchdog and socalled integrity branch institutions, which he argues is a part of a “project of
ideological capture of these institutions.”38
Aggressive political use of appointments has, Khaitan argues, allowed
the executive to aggrandize its authority by “incrementally but systemically”
undermining the independence of nearly all the statutory bodies put in place
to hold it to account, or temper its policymaking in light of core constitutional
values, by ensuring they “became subservient to the political executive or
were captured by party loyalists.”39 With some powerful accountability
institutions, like the anti-corruption ombudsman, the Prime Minister simply
neglected to nominate the head official for several years, effectively disabling
their ability to discharge their statutory functions.40 Again, as with the
Japanese example, these results would not be feasible in a highly technocratic
system of appointment insulated from political executive control.

36. Martin, supra note 33, at 475–78.
37. Tarunabh Khaitan, Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement
and Party-state Fusion in India, 14 L. & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS., 49, 77–78 (2020).
38. Id. at 77.
39. Id. at 92.
40. Id. at 77–78.
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C. Capturing the Bureaucracy
In Hungary, part of the “spectacular change” to the political system
brought about by the political party Fidesz’s extended period in power has
been its “quest to further enhance political control over administrative
apparatuses.”41 In the past decade, Prime Minister Orbán and his government
have made muscular use of appointment and removal powers to “fill all ranks
in the . . . government apparatuses with politically loyal . . . civil servants”42
sympathetic to the party’s goals. This has happened concurrently with the
removal of many civil servants not deemed suitably sympathetic to its
political aims, facilitated by legislation undermining bureaucratic security of
tenure.43
Even nominally independent administrative bodies like the State Audit
Office, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office, the Media Council, the Fundamental
Rights Ombudsman, the Monetary Council, the National Election
Commission, and the National Tax and Customs Administration experienced
replacements of opposition figures and ostensibly neutral technocrats, with
personnel better ideologically aligned to the Prime Minister and his party.44
Whether one is sympathetic or not, there is no doubting that Prime Minister
Orbán has used his authority to effect appointments and removals, which
have resulted in a “substantive and comprehensive transformation of the
[bureaucracy].”45 These appointments and removals have consequently
become a core mechanism to further his aim of building an illiberal and
unapologetically Christian-Nationalist polity.46
Similar trends have been recently documented in Poland, where
extensive civil service reforms have been undertaken since the Law and
Justice Party (PiS) took office in 2015. Core planks of these reforms have
included making senior bureaucratic appointments a matter of prime
ministerial discretion and no longer subject to a competitive public
application process; allowing the contracts of some senior appointments to
expire without renewal; and demoting senior officials to lower positions or

41. György Hajnal & Sándor Csengődi, When Crisis Hits Superman: Change and Stability of
Political Control and Politicization in Hungary, 15 ADMIN. CULTURE 39, 42 (2014).
42. Michael W. Bauer & Stefan Becker, Democratic Backsliding, Populism, and Public
Administration, PERSP. PUB. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE, Mar. 2020, at 24–25.
43. Hajnal & Csengődi, supra note 41, at 49.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 50.
46. Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July
2014, BUDAPEST BEACON (July 29, 2014), budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speechat-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/.
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dismissing them outright.47 In introducing these systemic reforms, the
governing PiS party openly argued it was important for the executive to have
greater authority to appoint civil servants who identify and sympathize with
its policies. The government argued that failure to keep the civil service
under close control may frustrate its political principal’s goals in favor of the
ideological goals of their own, or those derived from external actors hostile
to the executive’s.48
Following these reforms, the executive has exercised appointment and
removal powers with considerable enthusiasm, lacing the bureaucracy with
those loyal to its agenda while removing those considered potentially hostile
or obstructive. This ongoing process of bureaucratic transformation has
involved replacing thousands of civil servants across all ranks of the
bureaucracy,49 and restructuring the leadership of administrative bodies
concerned with everything from agriculture, broadcasting, health, education,
electoral competition, as well as nearly every state-owned company.50 As
Professor Sadurski puts it, “[n]o public or state-controlled institution” has
been “left untouched where nominees of the ancien régime could have been
found and PiS loyalists placed.”51 Aggressive use of appointment and
removal powers by the executive arguably represents the “most thorough,
and at the same time least publicly and internationally visible, aspect of the
state capture by PiS.”52
D. Greater Centralization of Administrative State Policymaking
1. Executive Synoptic Mechanism to Review Administrative
Policymaking
One method of centralization is for the political executive to create
synoptic mechanisms that monitor the work of administrative actors, either
by reviewing their agendas or preclearing their work before promulgation.
For example, U.S. Presidents of all political stripes have attempted to
coordinate regulatory activity and leverage more centralized control over
administrative bodies wielding delegated power to obtain significant policy

47. Stanisław Mazur, Michał Możdżeń, & Marek Oramus, The Instrumental and Ideological
Politicisation of Senior Positions in Poland’s Civil Service and its Selected Consequences,
NISPACEE J. PUB. ADMIN. & POL., Summer 2018, at 79.
48. Id. at 80.
49. David M. Driesen, The Unitary Executive Theory in Comparative Context, 72 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 34 (2020).
50. WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN 136 (2019).
51. Id. at 137.
52. Id. at 138.
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aims outside the legislative process.53 This control intensified considerably
following the creation of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which made the
regulatory activity of the administrative state “more and more an extension
of the President’s own policy and political agenda.”54
Executive Order No. 12,291—amended and expanded by several
presidents—determined that tailored regulatory impact assessments would be
applied to all major rules and regulations proposed by administrative bodies,
a review infused with the ideological principles of presidential incumbents.
For example, President Barack Obama added a requirement that proposed
regulations be consistent with non-quantitative criteria such as equity, human
dignity, and distributive impact.55 In contrast, Republican Presidents have
used these mechanisms for aggressive deregulatory purposes.56 President
Trump issued a supplementary executive order requiring administrative
bodies to repeal two regulations for every newly proposed regulation, in
addition to carrying out a cost-benefit analysis.57 President Trump’s order
was repealed by President Biden in January 2021, who, in turn, issued a new
order instructing the OMB to come up with recommendations about how to
reform the regulatory process to better ensure proposed regulations
“appropriately benefit and do not inappropriately burden disadvantaged,
vulnerable, or marginalized communities.”58
OIRA, in turn, subjects the consistency of proposed agency regulations
with these executive orders to review, amend, and comment before they are
promulgated. By acting as synoptic mechanisms to scrutinize the most
important activity of administrative bodies,59 these bodies increase
presidential influence as proposed agendas and regulatory activity are subject
to centralized review by their core staff before promulgation.60

53. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 717–18 (2007).
54. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001).
55. Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 3 C.F.R. § 13563
(2011).
56. Kagan, supra note 54, at 2349.
57. Exec. Order No. 13,771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed.
Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
58. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Modernizing
Regulatory Review, 86 Fed. Reg. 7223 (Jan. 26, 2021).
59. ADRIAN VERMEULE, Local and Global Knowledge in the Administrative State, in LAW,
LIBERTY AND STATE: OAKESHOTT, HAYEK AND SCHMITT ON THE RULE OF LAW 295 (David
Dyzenhaus & Thomas Poole eds., 2015).
60. Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States, 22 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 37, 41–42 (2019); Robert F. Durant & William G. Resh, “Presidentializing” the Bureaucracy,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 555 (Robert F. Durant ed., 2010).
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Presidents have also leaned on Article II to claim authority to issue
executive orders which guide and infuse the work of administrative bodies
with the moral and political goals of the incumbent president. As noted,
Executive Order No. 12,291 has been amended by successive presidential
incumbents in a manner allowing them to subject the work of administrative
bodies to a version of regulatory impact analysis defined by their political
philosophy. For example, President Barack Obama added a requirement that
proposed regulations be consistent with non-quantitative criteria such as
equity, human dignity, and distributive impact,61 whereas Republican
Presidents have used the same mechanisms for aggressive deregulatory
purposes.62
Presidents have also increasingly claimed authority to prompt
subordinates wielding statutory power to exercise discretion in a specified
way consistent with the former’s goals.63 Recent high-profile examples of
this directive authority in action include President Obama’s order to the
Agency head of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to halt
deportation investigations and proceedings of several million undocumented
immigrants who met the presidentially defined criteria, and direction to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to formulate and issue an ambitious
new regulation intended to significantly reduce United States carbon
emissions and contribution to global warming.64 Swiftly following
inauguration, President Trump took steps to quash these policies by ordering
the newly appointed heads of the DHS and EPA to rescind them both, an
order duly complied with.65 This directive authority, when combined with
the centralization of rulemaking in its hands, has turned the Executive Office
of the President into a regulatory clearinghouse with enhanced ability to
monitor, direct, and respond to the work of the entire administrative
apparatus.66
Drive for greater oversight of bureaucratic policymaking is not reserved
to presidential systems. In the United Kingdom, attempts to maintain the
functional autonomy of a diverse array of administrative bodies while
counteracting excessive fragmentation have been colored by cultivation of
greater political control over the administrative state by Prime Ministers. In
recent decades, the Prime Minister has been able to rely on institutional
mechanisms like the Cabinet Office, which has emerged as a synoptic

61. Exec. Order No. 13,563, supra note 55.
62. Kagan, supra note 54, at 2349.
63. Id.
64. Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated
Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 580 (2018).
65. Id.
66. Strauss, supra note 53.
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mechanism to scrutinize the firmament of administrative bodies outside core
government departments.67 The executive has directed that these kinds of
bodies be subjected to a rigorous review by the Cabinet Office in the lifetime
of every Parliament to determine whether their functions are (1) still needed;
(2) are still being delivered effectively by the organization; and (3) still
contribute to the goals of the executive.68
This synoptic mechanism for a time worked in tandem with the Public
Bodies Act 2011, enacted by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition
Government in office from 2010 to 2015. The Act was designed to assist the
government’s broader aim of reducing public spending by providing Cabinet
Ministers broad statutory power to abolish, merge, or restructure
administrative bodies by executive order and without further parliamentary
legislation.69 These kinds of mechanisms, more readily accessible to an
executive in a system where the executive has easier access to the levers of
legislative power, ensure administrative bodies who become overtly
obstructive to an incumbent executive’s political program become more
easily subject to political retribution in the form of the dismantling, or
restructuring, of their policy functions.70
2. Use of the Budgetary Process to Bolster or Curb Administrative
Action
The political executive’s position as lead policymaker in constitutional
democracies typically encompasses a central role over preparation of the
budget. This close control over budgetary powers gives political executives
a potent tool to shape the policy direction of administrative bodies and their
capacity to discharge their mandate.71
In the United States, for example, presidents have consistently used this
strong control over the budget process to direct more funds to regulatory
agendas they favor and to dent those they are opposed to.72 In the Reagan
era, for example, significant budget cuts were directed at bodies like the EPA
and the Food and Drug Administration to promote the presidency’s
67. HAZEL ARMSTRONG & CHLOE SMITH,
PUBLIC BODIES
12 (2021),
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8376/CBP-8376.pdf.
68. See Katharine Dommett, Muiris MacCarthaigh & Niamh Hardiman, Reforming the
Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland After the Crisis, 29 GOVERNANCE:
INT’L J. POL., ADMIN., & INSTS. 535 (2016).
69. Public Bodies Act 2011, c. 24 (UK).
70. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 698–702 (2000).
71. See Julia Black, Calling Regulators to Account: Challenges, Capacities and Prospects, in
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION 367–69 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter
Leyland eds., 2013).
72. See generally Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy
Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016).
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aggressive deregulatory agenda.73 More recently, the Trump Administration
sought to curtail the resources of agencies considered hostile to its objectives,
manifested through repeated (but largely unsuccessful) advocacy for very
sizeable cuts to the EPA and the State Department in the annual presidential
budget.74 Similarly, in Brazil, the President’s extensive influence over the
budgetary process75 is said to “deeply affect” the financial autonomy of
agencies designed to be independent in discharging their regulatory
functions, and Professor Prado notes that such powers have been “used to the
detriment” of such agencies in the recent past.76 Critics of Presidents Temer
and Bolsonaro, for example, have argued their antipathy toward climate
change activism and environmental regulation clearly received concrete
expression in the very sizeable cuts their successive budget proposals
recommended for leading environmental protection agencies.77 These cuts,
according to critics, have had a significant impact on agency morale and their
capacity to engage in patrolling and enforcing against unlawful activity
harmful to the environment. The very existence of these unilateral powers,
and a president’s willingness to use them, ensure presidential control over
agencies’ financial resources undoubtedly remains a potent incentive for
agencies to adopt their preferences under the threat of budget reductions.78
III. INCENTIVES FOR CONTROL
This Part gives an account of the several different incentives which
plausibly appear to be driving the use of these tools. I do so by bundling
them into several conceptual heuristics. These are not mutually exclusive
incentives, and it is likely one or more may be present or absent, as a
dominant or minor influence, at any given time in a polity where the political

73. Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1756–59 (2008).
74. Rebecca Beitsch & Rachel Frazin, Trump Budget Slashes EPA Funding, Environmental
Programs, HILL (Feb. 10, 2020, 2:18 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/482352trump-budget-slashes-funding-for-epa-environmental-programs.
75. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 84, § XXIV (Braz.).
76. See Mariana Mota Prado, Assessing the Theory of Presidential Dominance from a
Comparative Perspective: The Relationship Between the Executive Branch and Regulatory
Agencies in Brazil, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 225, 234 (Susan Rose-Ackerman et
al., eds., 2010).
77. Jake Spring & Stephen Eisenhammer, Exclusive: As Fires Race Through Amazon, Brazil’s
Bolsonaro Weakens Environment Agency, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazilenvironment-ibama-exclusive-idUSKCN1VI14I (Aug. 28, 2019, 6:13 AM); Scott Wallace, Brazil’s
New Leader Promised to Exploit the Amazon—but Can He?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/10/brazil-president-jairbolsonaro-promises-exploit-amazon-rain-forest/; Zoe Sullivan, The Real Reason the Amazon Is on
Fire, TIME (Aug. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://time.com/5661162/why-the-amazon-is-on-fire/.
78. See Prado, supra note 76, at 233–34.
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executive takes steps to exercise more control over the bureaucracy or to
erode bureaucratic autonomy.
One incentive is that executives want to infuse the administrative state
with their moral and political values. Bureaucracies will always face
inescapable political and ideological choices in choosing between different
factually plausible policy positions, or when trying to translate abstract moral
values like freedom, justice, and equality into concrete political choices.79 In
keeping with this sentiment, Vermeule has argued that the specialization and
technocratic competence of the bureaucracy can be regarded as a powerful
but ultimately “intrinsically neutral institutional technology” that must
inevitably be entrusted, explicitly or implicitly, with a mission of
“substantive content.”80 There is, on this account, no persuasive way one can
attempt to articulate policies in an apolitical technocratic manner, ensuring
administrative states will inevitably have fundamental principles and an
implicit or explicit guiding moral vision which infuses everything it does.
Filling this normative vacuum is where political executives increasingly
seem to come in. Unlike diffuse and fractious legislative assemblies, or lowcapacity and undemocratic judicial bodies, hierarchical bureaucracies
commanded by an energetic, unified, and motivated political executive81 are
“uniquely positioned” to inject substantive moral content into bureaucratic
action.82 Political executive use of the tools discussed in Part II to coordinate,
direct, and centralize review and approval of policy activity carried out the
length and breadth the administrative apparatus is a potent means for it to
marry “Hamiltonian and technocratic features” of governance.83 That is,
linking reliance on technocratic expertise and competence with executive
attempts to combat interest group capture, myopic policymaking by subjectspecific administrative bodies, or general bureaucratic torpor, all of which
might run counter to pursuit of its vision of the common good.84
Another potential incentive is less benign and can be linked to a desire
for executive aggrandizement more generally.
Many public law
79. See Conor Casey, ‘Common-Good Constitutionalism’ and the New Battle over
Constitutional Interpretation in the United States, 4 PUB. L. 765, 781 (2021); Lloyd N. Cutler &
David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1405 (1975).
80. Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Mystery, MIRROR OF JUST. (Mar. 22,
2019), https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2019/03/bureaucracy-and-mystery-.html.
81. Adrian Vermeule, Ralliement: Two Distinctions, JOSIAS (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://thejosias.com/2018/03/16/ralliement-two-distinctions/.
82. Vermeule, supra note 2.
83. Kagan, supra note 54, at 2339. Hamiltonian is of course a reference to a core theme of
Alexander Hamilton’s political writings; namely, his famous contention that public welfare required
an efficacious government, one with leadership provided by an accountable executive dedicated to
pursuing policies for the common good with “[d]ecision,” “dispatch,” and “energy.” Id. at 2343;
see generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
84. Vermeule, supra note 2, at 2464.
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commentators argue executive aggrandizement in established constitutional
democracies is the key commonality of the apparently widespread trend of
what has been variously dubbed “democratic backsliding” and
“constitutional retrogression.”85 In Professors Huq and Ginsburg’s typology
of the pathways common to these various trends—including the
centralization of power in the executive branch; the elimination of
institutional checks on its authority; contraction of a public sphere
independent from executive influence; and the erosion of political
competition86—the unifying core is that the political executive uses its
predominant position to gradually, but systematically, weaken any real
institutional checks on, or competition to, its power. 87
Capture of the administrative state and the erosion of bureaucratic
autonomy can be important aspects of this process, and each of the forms of
politicization and centralization examined in Part II can certainly be used to
further this end—which can have serious consequences for how public power
is channeled and exercised. Use of authority over appointment and removal
to appoint partisan loyalists to the bureaucracy and independently checking
institutions can be powerful means to stymie opponents and deter would-be
pushback or opposition to its ideological goals.88 Use of centralized and
synoptic mechanisms and threats leveraged by potential budget cuts can also
be potent ways for the executive to curb the ability of bureaucrats to engage
in policymaking antithetical to their ideological commitments, or to offer
resistance to policies.89 The final part of this Essay briefly considers how
public lawyers ought to normatively assess use of the tools outlined in Part
II, bearing in mind the different possible incentives driving their use just
canvassed.
IV. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
A. Partisan Capture and Executive Aggrandizement
The contention all administrative decisions are political is true, but it
must be carefully unpacked.90 As Stephenson notes, there are always two
possible senses of political in this context, sometimes overlapping but
sometimes very distinct. The first is that administrative decision-making
85. See MARK A. GRABER, SANFORD LEVINSON & MARK TUSHNET, Introduction to
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 1 (Mark A. Graber et al. eds., 2018).
86. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA. L. REV.
78, 118 (2018).
87. Id.
88. Tarunabh Khaitan, Executive Aggrandizement in Established Democracies: A Crisis of
Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 342, 351 (2019).
89. JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 45 (2016).
90. Vermeule, supra note 80.
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involves normative determinations of the best policy to enact for the polity
given the prevailing economic, social, and legal conditions and constraints.
The second sense of political is narrower and linked to ensuring the partisan
political success of an incumbent in maintaining power.91
Several obvious risks loom in circumstances where an executive erodes
bureaucratic independence and autonomy to the extent officials are more
likely to make determinations aligned with the executive’s political
preferences—not in the thicker normative sense, but in the crude partisan
sense unconcerned with the common good. Bureaucrats mainly focused on
their reputation before a partisan political audience will, it stands to reason,
also be more willing to compromise commitment to professional norms,
technocratic expertise, and to the statutory mission of the administrative
body, at least when compared to administrators whose agenda is shaped by
such values and due respect for elected representatives and their ideological
priorities. A myopic partisan focus on loyalty neglectful of the competing
concerns of competence and professionalism will invariably multiply the
likelihood of policy being anchored on “false factual premises or faulty
theories.”92
As bad as all this is, staffing bureaucracies with political hacks
dedicated to diligently implementing executive directives, no matter how
arbitrary, odious, or irrational, can carry greater risks still. Because if done
with enough partisan aggression and at a large enough scale, executive
control over the administrative state can be used as a potentially
revolutionary pathway to hollow out well-established principles associated
with constitutional government, like the rule of law, robust prosecutorial
independence, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free and fair
electoral competition with a genuine chance of party rotation of power. Such
important principles will clearly suffer if bureaucrats like prosecutors and
revenue officials can arbitrarily hang the threat of sanctions over the heads
of political opponents of the executive, if regulators can engage in targeted
harassment of media opposed to their political masters’ policies, or if
electoral commissions and human rights ombudsmen can turn a blind eye to,
or smooth over, the distortion of electoral competition or human rights
abuses.
B. Risks of Bureaucratic Autonomy
On the other hand, there are several downsides we can associate with
bureaucrats exercising capacious policy authority with large degrees of
91. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Qualities of Public Servants Determine the Quality of Public
Service, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (2019).
92. Barry Sullivan & Christine Kexel Chabot, The Science of Administrative Change, 52 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2020).
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autonomy and insulation from political executive direction. Consider some
of the most pressing challenges facing constitutional democracies today, like
economic and health inequalities, ecological degradation, and inchoate
feelings of political alienation and social displacement amongst citizens, all
of which are toxic to a flourishing political community.93 A core plank of
seriously tackling these kinds of problems no doubt requires robustly using
the structures of state power and the administrative state—whose work
invariably touches on nearly every facet of socio-economic life—and
effectuating change through them.94
Such an endeavor cannot hope to succeed unless the institutions of the
executive and administrative state are led and staffed by personnel
sufficiently committed to achieving similar normative ends. As such, a civil
service staffed with personnel with an excessively Burkean95 disposition to
addressing pressing political problems, or who are trapped by old-fashioned
or defunct socioeconomic paradigms,96 or a deep reluctance to address them
out of ideological disagreement or an alignment with vested private interests,
may jeopardize their resolution. Energetic use of the tools outlined in Part II
may be critical to ensuring the potent institutional technology of the
administrative state is not functionally captured by powerful private interests,
ossified due to excessive or misguided “small c” conservatism, or acts on its
own ideological commitments in a manner which seriously frustrates the
executives’ pursuit of conditions required to secure the common good.
C. Finding the Optimal Path
Much more difficult than avoiding these dangers, however, is carving
out an optimal institutional path of executive-bureaucratic relations which
guards against both. Given the deeply contextual nature of the analysis, I
suggest public lawyers adopt an analytical disposition to these questions
mixed with prudence and principle. They should be prudential by refraining
from offering blanket observations or cautions about the appropriate
relationship between the political executive and permanent bureaucracy vis93. Martin Loughlin, The Contemporary Crisis of Constitutional Democracy, 39 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 435, 444–45 (2019).
94. Casey, supra note 79, at 781.
95. I use Burkean as a shorthand for the set of political and moral propositions associated with
the writings and speeches of the Irish statesman and political philosopher Edmund Burke. Common
themes in Burke’s thought include the need for political change to proceed cautiously, with a high
premium placed on values like epistemic humility, prudence, and social stability. Burke also placed
considerable weight on custom and long-standing traditional practices, seeing their very persistence
as attesting to their latent wisdom and utility. Those of a Burkean disposition are more likely to
value small-scale incremental or organic policy change as opposed to sudden ambitious or largescale change. Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1487 (2007).
96. Ackerman, supra note 70, at 701–02.
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à-vis the legal and political tools outlined in Part II. Prudence warrants
accepting that the relationship between the political executive and
bureaucracy and trade-offs between values like executive energy,
technocratic competence, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic
autonomy, that offer the best via media to orient the administrative state
toward the common good, will simply vary considerably depending on the
polity concerned and its concrete circumstances. This is in some ways,
therefore, a deflationary argument that counsels that the normative argument
about this relationship must be disciplined by an appropriately contextual
inquiry.
But caution in this context should not be conflated with an argument for
normative relativism—far from it. Instead, it is critical public law scholars
remain principled in their analysis in the sense that their criteria of evaluating
abuse or appropriateness of institutional design or change in each system
should always be oriented towards a compelling master commitment, one
consistent with the ultimate ends and purpose of constitutional government—
such as the common good or general welfare.97 Ultimately, I hope this Essay
encourages both comparative study and searching system-specific critical
assessment of shifts in executive-bureaucratic relations by offering a
preliminary comparative sketch of how different executives go about
leveraging greater control over the bureaucracy, the incentives driving these
trends, and the normative benefits and risks they can pose.

97. N.W. BARBER, THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 2–6 (2018).

